










# EXPLAINING DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY










YAHOO!  ebay  

FOR INSTANCE, IN THE PAST TEN YEARS, BILLIONS OF PERSONAL USERS HAVE HAD THEIR DATA SUCH AS CREDIT CARD NUMBERS, PASSWORDS, LOCATIONS, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS, AND MORE LEAKED BY 'TRUSTED' CORPORATIONS LIKE YAHOO, ADOBE, EBAY, MARRIOTT, LINKEDIN, AND OTHERS. EVEN WORSE, THESE ATTACKS ARE ONLY BECOMING MORE SOPHISTICATED AND FREQUENT IN NATURE.




IN ADDITION TO SECURITY BREACHES, ORGANIZATIONS OFTEN HERALD THE DE IDENTIFICATION OF PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION BY REMOVING SO CALLED OBVIOUS IDENTIFIERS SUCH AS NAMES OR ADDRESSES. NONETHELESS, ANONYMIZED DATA IS STILL VERY PRONE TO RE IDENTIFICATION AND RECONSTRUCTION ATTACKS

~~NAME: JOHN~~      ~~NAME: MARY~~      ~~NAME: SAM~~  
~~ADDRESS: 4th Ave~~      ~~NAME: LILY~~      ~~ADDRESS: UPPLE~~  
~~NAME: JAMES~~      ~~ADDRESS: 38, DANE ST~~      ~~ADDRESS: SUN PARK~~  
~~ADDRESS: GROOVE STREET~~      ~~NAME: MICHAEL~~      ~~NAME: Ashley~~  
~~ADDRESS: LOS SAN ANGELES~~      ~~ADDRESS: Sunset~~      ~~NAME: Cassidy~~  
~~NAME: FRANK~~      ~~NAME: PEAC~~      ~~ADDRESS: O STREET~~  
~~ADDRESS: Venice beach~~      ~~ADDRESS: SW~~      ~~NAME: MAYOR~~  
~~ADDRESS:~~       ~~ADDRESS:~~       ~~ADDRESS: Lissen Close~~




FOR EXAMPLE, IN HER 1997 GROUNDBREAKING RESEARCH, MIT PROF. LATANYA SWEENEY WAS ABLE TO LINK PUBLICLY AVAILABLE VOTER REGISTRATION DATA TO AN ANONYMIZED MEDICAL DATASET AND EASILY RE IDENTIFY PEOPLE FROM THE ANONYMIZED DATASET. MOST NOTABLY SHE SENT THEN MASSACHUSETTS GOVERNOR BILL WELD HIS FORMERLY ANONYMOUS HEALTH RECORDS INCLUDING PRESCRIPTIONS AND DIAGNOSES TO HIS PERSONAL OFFICE






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VOTING FORM	
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




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THUS, IF BOB IS AN INNOCENT GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL  
HE'LL STILL GET A USEFUL ANSWER  
THAT'S APPROXIMATELY CORRECT.  
OTHERWISE, ALICE IS STILL CONFIDENT THAT  
NO ONE'S PRIVACY IS COMPROMISED. EVERYONE WINS!



TO PUT IT IN OTHER TERMS, DIFFERENTIAL  
PRIVACY GUARANTEES THAT ALICE'S  
ANSWER WOULD ALMOST ALWAYS BE THE  
SAME REGARDLESS OF WHETHER A SPECIFIC  
INDIVIDUAL WAS OR WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE  
DATASET. THEREBY, BOB CAN'T USE HIS QUESTIONS  
TO DETERMINE IF A SPECIFIC PERSON'S DATA IS  
PRESENT OR NOT REGARDLESS OF WHAT HE KNOWS



HOLD UP! I DON'T KNOW IF I MISHEARD BUT  
DIDN'T YOU SAY ALMOST ALWAYS?  
DOES THIS MEAN THAT BOB COULD STILL  
EVENTUALLY FIGURE OUT IF AN  
INDIVIDUAL WAS IN THE DATABASE??



GREAT OBSERVATION! BOB DOES INDEED  
STILL LEARN A LITTLE BIT ABOUT  
THE DATABASE EACH TIME HE ASKS A QUESTION, BUT THAT'S  
WHERE THE CONCEPT OF A PRIVACY BUDGET COMES INTO PLAY.



WITH DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY, WE CAN PRECISELY MATHEMATICALLY  
DEFINE HOW MUCH PRIVACY BUDGET TO ASSIGN TO A  
SYSTEM WHERE EACH QUESTION WILL EXHAUST  
A SMALL PART OF THAT BUDGET.



SO WE KNOW PRECISELY WHAT PRIVACY RISK WE HAVE?







YES, EXACTLY! THAT'S THE BEAUTY OF DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY IN IT'S STRONG DEFINITION OF PRIVACY.



SO IF BOB HAD ASKED ENOUGH QUESTIONS SO THAT HE FULLY USED UP THE BUDGET, HE WOULD THEN BE ABLE TO IDENTIFY INDIVIDUALS IN THE DATASET, BUT FORTUNATELY WE HAVE ALICE TO MONITOR THIS BUDGET! SHE CAN SEE THAT WE'RE CLOSE TO EXHAUSTING THE PRIVACY BUDGET THEN STOP ANSWERING ANY QUESTIONS UNTIL WE MAKE FURTHER CHANGES AND CAN SAFELY ANSWER MORE QUESTIONS.



THAT'S AWESOME! SO NOW THAT DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY IS IMPLEMENTED, ALL OF MY DATA IS SAFE THEN RIGHT? I CAN TRUST ALL SYSTEMS THAT ARE DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE!



WHOA, NOT SO FAST THERE! JUST BECAUSE A COMPANY MAKES DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY CLAIMS FOR THEIR SYSTEM DOESN'T MEAN YOU CAN JUST BLINDLY TRUST THEM.



YOU WOULDN'T JUST BLINDLY ENTER A CAR AND IMMEDIATELY TRUST THE DRIVER WITH YOUR LIFE, ESPECIALLY GIVEN THIS CAR HAS FAR MORE DIRE CONSEQUENCES IF IT CRASHES. AS A PASSENGER, YOU'D STILL WATCH THE ROAD AND CHECK THE DRIVER'S OVERALL COMPETENCY BEST YOU CAN.





